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A. p.

Richardson, Editor

EDITORIAL
The council of the American Institute of
International Congress
Accountants
has resolved to act upon a
of Accountants
suggestion received from the president
of the International Congress of Accountants that the next meet
ing of that organization should be called for 1929 and that the
place should be somewhere in the United States. The council
directed the executive committee to appoint a special committee
to make plans and to invite other organizations of accountants to
cooperate. The executive committee acted promptly in accord
ance with instructions and a special committee has been appointed,
invitations to cooperate have gone to other societies of account
ants and arrangements are now being made for a preliminary
meeting of the committee of the Institute with the committees of
other societies to be held before the end of this year. The Insti
tute’s committee is representative of all parts of the country and
no firm is represented by more than one member. It is impossible
at this time to make any definite statement about the proposed
congress. The programme will be comprehensive and it will be
desirable to have the active and hearty support of all who are in
terested in accountancy. Men who attended the Amsterdam
meeting in 1926 express the opinion that there will be delegates
from nearly every European country, and it is confidently ex
pected that all the American republics will send representatives.
It seems probable that such a congress will select Washington as
the place of meeting. There could be no better place and the
facilities available there are adequate in every way. Visitors
from abroad naturally will wish to see the national capital and the
executive departments of government will certainly be glad to
encourage a meeting which will do much to bring about better
understanding between nations. This congress is to be a matter
of importance, and accountants throughout the country should
be willing to do all that lies within their power to make it the
success which the honor of American accountancy requires that it
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shall be. From time to time announcements of plans and of
progress will be made in the publications of the Institute, and
doubtless in other papers as well, and we urge all who read to
take and to maintain interest in what will be done.
There has been a good deal of doubt in
Treasury Department
the minds of accountants as to the
Circular 230
meaning and effect of one of the para
graphs of the treasury department’s revised circular number 230
with reference to the certificates required of practitioners before
the bureau of internal revenue. So many letters were received
asking for an opinion on the subject that the matter was placed
before the counsel of the Institute and we are glad to present his
reply for the information of our readers. It will appear that the
fears which many accountants expressed that the requirements
can not be literally observed do not seem well founded. Counsel
says:
“ In accordance with your request for an opinion as to the proper method
of complying with paragraph 2 (f) of treasury department revised circular
No. 230, I have studied that circular and discussed its purpose and scope
at the treasury department. My opinion follows:
“Paragraph 2 (f) of circular No. 230 (revised July 1, 1927) provides as
follows:
“ Every affidavit, argument, brief or statement of facts prepared or
filed by an attorney or agent as argument or evidence in the matter of a
claim or tax matter pending before the treasury department shall have
thereon a statement signed by such attorney or agent showing whether
or not he prepared such document and whether or not the attorney or
agent knows of his own knowledge that the facts contained therein are
true.”
“This paragraph can best be understood in the light of the evil sought
to be prevented. Unscrupulous practitioners have prepared both for
submission by taxpayers and for submission by themselves to the depart
ment false statements. In such cases the difficulty of proving who is the
real culprit is obvious. In some cases the practitioner does not appear at
all; in others he attempts to shift the responsibility to the taxpayer or to
some third person.
“ The object of the present paragraph is to insure that every practitioner
preparing or filing a paper shall state to what extent he assumes responsi
bility for the document. It is not to embarrass honest practitioners.
The two questions asked do not have to be answered categorically ‘ yes ’ or
‘no.’ The true facts may and should be stated. For instance, a practi
tioner might state that a brief was prepared in his office and under his
supervision and direction; that certain (specified) exhibits were prepared
at his request by the taxpayer, or an appraiser or whoever did prepare
them; that the facts or certain of them (specifying) he knows to be true
or that the facts were furnished to him by the taxpayer or another and that
he believes them to be true.
“ In short, it is my opinion that the department wants to know the facts
as to how and by whom the document was prepared and how far the person
or persons preparing it or furnishing it assumes responsibility for its
veracity.
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“From what has been said above it follows that the signing of a firm
name to such a statement does not accomplish the end sought. That end
is to fix individual responsibility and to prevent this responsibility from
being shifted when trouble arises. If a firm (either of lawyers or ac
countants) prepares or files a document, some enrolled attorney or agent
must assume responsibility for it, or make it clear that no responsibility is
assumed.”

A well-known lawyer at a recent meeting
of the New York State Society of Certified
Public Accountants propounded the
suggestion that it would be well to adopt in this country a pro
vision of law similar to that contained in the English companies
acts with reference to the information which must accompany
every offering of corporate securities. He spoke of the difference
between the price paid by bankers or syndicates of bankers for
stocks and bonds and the price at which the same securities are
offered to the public—a difference which is called in the jargon of
Wall street “the spread.” This is not a new idea. It has been
uttered many times. But it is always interesting and always will
be until the time comes when every detail to which the investor is
justly entitled is made available to him. (The requirements of
many of the so-called “blue-sky” laws of the states call for the ex
position of detail, but there is no uniformity and the information
seldom reaches the public.) It matters not whether the difference
between the price received by the issuing company and that paid
by the public is considered commission or profit upon sale and
purchase—the effect is the same. It is true, and generally known
to be true, that the charge for underwriting an issue of securities is
often out of all fair proportion to the amounts received by the
borrowing companies. It is always a difficult matter to float a
large volume of new securities without aid of one or more in
fluential banking houses whose standing and clientele assure a sale
of anything that looks reasonably safe and sound. Theoretically
it should be possible for the company which needs money for
working capital to advertise its wants, and, when there is such an
abundance of money as there has been in America for several
years past, it should be a perfectly simple matter to obtain funds
directly from the investor without the intervention of a middle
man. But we all know that this theory is good only as a theory.
Practically the lender and the borrower, if the link between them
is in the form of securities, never meet. And the costs of the
services which the investment banker renders are high in inverse
ratio to the merit of the bonds, debentures or stock which are con440
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cerned. In other words, the more reputable bankers are content
with a smaller spread because they endeavor to restrict their
energies to the best class of securities. When a really good
medium of investment is coming to the market there is not a
dearth of underwriters and, consequently, even if the bankers
were inclined to charge excessive fees or profits for their efforts,
they would be forced by the fact of competition to accept a lower
compensation. But the reputable banking house is not addicted
to the practice of extorting the uttermost farthing, even if it can
be obtained. It is the other kind of banking venture—venture is
a good word—which charges and overcharges to the disadvantage
of both lender and borrower. Such a concern spreads the spread
to unconscionable extent—and unfortunately it is to that kind of
concern that many borrowers are forced to appeal. The less
evident the strength of an issuing company the more difficult it is
to enlist the support of good bankers, and so the investment
shark comes in and swallows up all that he can reach. It is quite
certain that the proposal to require full information of costs,
commissions, spread, etc., will be vigorously opposed by those
houses which have profited most richly by the past and present
absence of compulsory publicity. But, on the other hand, the
banker of good repute should and doubtless would welcome the
utmost frankness about his dealings. The public is pretty
generally foolish when it invests—always when it gambles—but it
is not so utterly asinine as to ignore danger signals which would
be displayed if we had laws demanding that the profits of pro
moters and underwriters be shown in full. The public can
probably be trusted to take note of the disparity between profits
of five per cent. and fifty per cent.
A little more than a year ago there was
quite a flutter in the financial centers
about some rather startling allegations to
the effect that the public was being grossly deceived by the pub
lished accounts of corporations whose securities were the media of
common investment. These stories were not all well founded, but
there was a sufficient amount of truth underlying the general criti
cism to arouse the people who have money to invest and also the
exchanges, the bankers and brokers. As America is today the
richest nation in the world and as its wealth is more widely dis
tributed than the wealth of any other country, it naturally follows
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that the investing public is a very substantial percentage of the
nation as a whole. What stirs the investor, therefore, stirs the
whole people directly or indirectly. For a few months there was
reason to believe that we were to have a great reform. Ac
countants seized the opportunity to write and speak for the cause
of frank publicity. Exchanges professed a zeal for the work of
improving conditions. Everyone who had anything to do with
money or the sale of money was filled with enthusiasm—a kind of
religious fervor swept over us. But a year has gone by. The
conditions are not changed. There is little more frankness than
there was. It begins to appear that the effect of the revival is,
like the effect of many noble plans, almost exactly nil. Most of
us have forgotten that the banner of the crusade was ever raised.
We have stopped at Stamboul. Yet if there was a cause last
year, there is one today. Every accountant admits quite eagerly
that things are not altogether as they should be. He would like
to see absolute exposition of detail for the benefit of the public.
There are, of course, always some intimate internal details which
have no bearing upon the stability of a concern and could only be
made known to the advantage of competitors. But it is seldom
indeed that the company which is sound and onward-going has
anything to lose by telling the whole truth. There are so many
ways in which the reader of a financial statement may be deceived
that it is unnecessary to attempt to recite them here. The ac
countant has been preaching the crusade for years but his voice
has not prevailed; he has been accused of self-interest. Of course,
he would like to see full statements of conditions because he would
be called upon to prepare them. But when outsiders who could
have no ulterior purpose to serve, excepting perhaps an excusable
willingness to ascend the rostrum, directed the attention of the
people to the facts it was suddenly discovered that the accountant
had not been such a false prophet as he had been held to be. The
accountant was not altogether unselfish in crying for reform, but
if a great good to the whole people involves a small good to a
particular class of the people that does not seem sufficient reason
for postponing or rejecting it. It is rather silly to refuse a blessing
because it is to be universal. However, it is unnecessary to argue
that point now. What is before us is the sad and astonishing
failure of the public to insist upon reform when the need for reform
has been not only revealed but acclaimed. Truly, the American
public is a marvellous entity. It is not physically inert or even
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lazy, but at times it does appear to be extraordinarily apathetic.
The oldest observer of Wall street would not have believed that
within a year from the excitement which followed the call for
facts the whole incident would have passed without action and
have been forgotten. Perhaps the bull market which ran so long
a course made people lose sight of everything else. If there had
been a falling market, a shortage of money, a psychological or an
actual depression in business, people would have had more time
to devote to reform. No one longs for a dull market, but it may
have its advantages.

Now, what is there in this proposal that
the profit of the underwriter be disclosed
which makes it any more probable of
effect? Certainly the accountant is not directly interested. It
means nothing to him as an accountant whether the spread be
tween purchase and sale be revealed or not. And it is not quite
clear to us what the speaker who made the proposal thought that
accountants could do to advance the plan which he had in mind.
Possibly accountants as a class could urge publicity in the cause
of fairness to all concerned; but it seems to us that the matter is
one for legislation, and it is notorious that the accountants’ in
fluence upon general legislation is not considerable. The speaker,
however, referred to the British custom and the law which governs
the issuance of securities and here he raised a question in which
accountants have a vital interest. We have said times out of
number that the greatest need, from the accountant’s point of
view, is the enactment of legislation in all our states embodying
the principles of the English companies acts. There are many
features of the system of regulating companies in Great Britain
which might not apply here, but for the most part the laws and
regulations which have been found satisfactory in that country
could be adapted to the conditions in the United States. The
provision relative to the election of auditors is one to which we
have referred frequently. The choice of auditors by shareholders
rather than by directors is absolutely sound in theory and prac
tice. The rule that auditors shall not be changed except for
cause or at their own wish is also salutary. And there are many
other requirements which might be imported and would do much
to allay the doubts which have been properly expressed here as to
the sufficiency of the statements which companies issue. On the
443
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question of what shall be disclosed about expenses of flotation and
sale of securities the English act provides as follows:
81.— ...
(h) The amount (if any) paid within the two preceding years, or
payable, as commission for subscribing or agreeing to sub
scribe, or procuring or agreeing to procure subscriptions, for
any shares in, or debentures of, the company, or the rate of
any such commission: provided that it shall not be necessary
to state the commission payable to sub-underwriters; and
(i) The amount or estimated amount of preliminary expenses; and
(j) The amount paid within the two preceding years or intended to
be paid to any promoter, and the consideration for any such
payment; and.......
89.—(1) It shall be lawful for a company to pay a commission to any
person in consideration of his subscribing or agreeing to subscribe, whether
absolutely or conditionally, for any shares in the company, or procuring or
agreeing to procure subscriptions, whether absolute or conditional, for any
shares in the company, if the payment of the commission is authorised by
the articles, and the commission paid or agreed to be paid does not exceed
the amount or rate so authorised, and if the amount or rate per cent. of the
commission paid or agreed to be paid is—
(a) In the case of shares offered to the public for subscription, dis
closed in the prospectus; or
(b) In the case of shares not offered to the public for subscription,
disclosed in the statement in lieu of prospectus, or in a state
ment in the prescribed form signed in like manner as a state
ment in lieu of prospectus and filed with the registrar of
companies, and, where a circular or notice, not being a pro
spectus, inviting subscription for the shares is issued, also dis
closed in that circular or notice.
(2) Save as aforesaid, no company shall apply any of its shares or
capital money either directly or indirectly in payment of any commission,
discount, or allowance, to any person in consideration of his subscribing or
agreeing to subscribe, whether absolutely or conditionally, for any shares
of the company, or procuring or agreeing to procure subscriptions, whether
absolute or conditional, for any shares in the company, whether the shares
or money be so applied by being added to the purchase money of any
property acquired by the company or to the contract price of any work to
be executed for the company, or the money be paid out of the nominal
purchase money or contract price, or otherwise.
(3) Nothing in this section shall affect the power of any company to
pay such brokerage as it has heretofore been lawful for a company to pay,
and a vendor to, promoter of, or other person who receives payment in
money or shares from, a company shall have and shall be deemed always to
have had power to apply any part of the money or shares so received in
payment of any commission, the payment of which, if made directly by
the company, would have been legal under this section.
90. Where a company has paid any sums by way of commission in
respect of any shares or debentures, or allowed any sums by way of dis
count in respect of any debentures, the total amount so paid or allowed, or
so much thereof as has not been written off, shall be stated in every balancesheet of the company until the whole amount thereof has been written off.

There is, however, a new spirit at work
in the financial world and in course of
time it will so prevail that the obscure
methods of an earlier day will be entirely abandoned—at least it
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seems probable. Of course every well informed man knows that
not one half the villainy of which financiers have been accused ever
existed outside the fancy of political demagogues and their disci
ples, but it is equally true that some very damnable things have
been done and perhaps are still being done in the name of invest
ment. Thousands of people have been deceived and thousands
of families have been impoverished by the plausible wiles of men
and companies engaged in the business of selling what seemed to
be securities. There have always been honest bankers and
brokers, but it must be admitted, even by the most devout apolo
gist, that in years which the ancient among us can remember well
there was a lamentable abundance of dishonesty, baseness and
thievery to be found wherever financial affairs were handled.
That time, however, is happily past and the business of finance is
a business at least as fairly and openly conducted as any other.
The shark of Wall street is in bad odor and he would soon
starve to death if everyone would listen to the warnings which are
everywhere displayed. It is a great pity that a business which is
so intimately concerned with the life and happiness of a great
majority of the people should have been defamed and obstructed
by the unprincipled practices of some of its early participants.
The average man of Chicago or San Francisco or Atlanta or New
York knows that as a whole the investment business is conducted
well, but if the average man of a great city will travel a little way
from home and visit with his brother, the average man of the
small town, he will be astonished to find how almost universal is
yet the belief that every financier—using the term in its true sense
—is merely a slightly polished footpad. The resident of Smith
ville or Jonesburg would sooner risk the perils of the hold-up belt
in Chicago or New York than enter unarmed and unaccompanied
a broker’s office in the financial districts of those cities. It is well
to remember the truth. It helps to explain the readiness with
which a style of political oratory is received by the country at
large. However, it is quite certain that if the investment business
had always been conducted on the present plane it would be in
general favor. It suffers today from past misdeeds. It labors
under the burden of the policy or impolicy which was summarized
in the phrase “The public be damned.” Russia is the victim of
sovietism because of its over-indulgence in the wine of tyranny.
All this by a too roundabout way is leading up to a reference to
something which was mentioned in the daily papers not long ago,
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but does not seem to have attracted the attention it deserves.
It would be an excellent means of wiping mist from the spectacles
of the public if the facts about this affair were known. The case
to which we refer was an application of the principle which many
of our good mercantile houses have adopted “Your money back
if you are not satisfied,” and it was applied to so considerable a
matter as an issue of debentures which in the language of the
market place had “gone bad.” The banking house of Hayden,
Stone & Co., sent the following letter to the protective commit
tee for debenture holders of the Shipman Coal Co.:
New York City, October 4, 1927.
Shipman Coal Company Debenture Holders
Protective Committee:
Dear Sirs:
As you know, we have been carrying on negotiations with various coal
companies operating in the anthracite field looking toward the further de
velopment of the properties of the Shipman Coal Company. We proposed
to each of several different companies that we would furnish one half, if
they would furnish the other half, of any additional capital needed for
these properties and that they take over the management thereof. We
regret to say that each has refused to proceed because of the showing in
underground developments made during the past year.
In the meantime, we have been furnishing money to receivers, acting
under court appointment, to keep the mines pumped out. Being satisfied
that further expenditure would be useless, we have determined to notify
the receivers that we will not provide further funds and also to notify the
lessors of the company’s property to this effect.
We could not conscientiously advise you to spend your money on this
property. If you do not, the receivers doubtless will arrange immediately
for the sale of the company’s assets, which consist of operating equipment
having practically a scrap value only.
We understand that you, as a debenture holders’ committee, have
claims, the enforcement of which is now being considered against the
officers of Shipman Coal Company and/or Weston Dodson & Co., Inc., or
its officers who were managing the operation of Shipman Coal Company.
Under these circumstances, because of those who, relying on us and our
investigations, put their money into these securities, we hereby make the
following voluntary offer to you and through you to debenture holders
whom you represent:
If you will begin and prosecute to final judgment all necessary and
proper actions and take any other steps proper to endeavor to establish
and enforce your claims, including those against those connected with the
management of these properties, we will defray the actual cost of such
proceedings; and, in the end, will reimburse all depositors for the difference
between the net amounts, if any, that may be finally recovered by you
through such actions or proceedings and the par value of the debentures
deposited by them.
Please communicate with the debenture holders, and after such expres
sion as you may obtain from them, advise us of your action upon this offer.
Very truly yours,
Hayden, Stone & Co.

We have been told that this is not the first time that a loss has
been made good by an investment banking house, but, if it is not
the first, it is at least among the first and it affords a splendid
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object lesson of what may be called the new day in finance. Of
course many people will say that the protection of investors was
necessary in order to save the good name of the house, and that is
true; but that argument does not destroy the moral of the story—
it strengthens it, rather. It indicates the change in conditions
which now makes it necessary to amend the old warning to read
“Let the seller beware.” The action of the bankers in this case
may not be quickly followed by all who deal in securities today,
but it is at any rate a hint of what may be done some day. There
is much talk of the guaranty of deposits—perhaps that will come.
It seems to be only a short distance from that to the guaranty of
investments which may be brought about by two causes, both
good, namely, altruism and self-protection.
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